Claims of election fraud throughout the 2020 U.S. Presidential Election and during the lead up to the January 6, 2021 insurrection attempt have drawn attention to the urgent need to better understand how people interpret and act on disinformation. In this work, we present three primary contributions: (1) a framework for understanding the interaction between participatory disinformation and informal and tactical mobilization; (2) three case studies from the 2020 U.S. election analyzed using detailed temporal, content, and thematic analysis; and (3) a qualitative coding scheme for understanding how digital disinformation functions to mobilize online audiences. We combine resource mobilization theory with previous work examining participatory disinformation campaigns and "deep stories" to show how false or misleading information functioned to mobilize online audiences before, during, and after election day. Our analysis highlights how users on Twitter collaboratively construct and amplify alleged evidence of fraud that is used to facilitate action, both online and off. We find that mobilization is dependent on the selective amplification of false or misleading tweets by influencers, the framing around those claims, as well as the perceived credibility of their source. These processes are a self-reinforcing cycle where audiences collaborate in the construction of a misleading version of reality, which in turn leads to offline actions that are used to further reinforce a manufactured reality. Through this work, we hope to better inform future interventions.

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https://hci.top/en/papers/cscw/124419/2023

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CSCW
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2023
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